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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN A. COOK and 




NOEL L. COOK, et al, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15811 
This is an action by Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiffs, in two counts, to-wit: 
in Count I they seek to foreclose a mortgage on real pro-
perty securing an indebtedness of Defendant-Appellant Noel 
L. Cook, hereinafter referred to as Defendant, to them in 
the amount of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00); in 
Count II they seek to recover Three Thousand Nine Hundred 
Forty-Four Dollars ($3,944.00) which Plaintiffs loaned to 
Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court found that Defendant was indebted 
to Plaintiffs in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Dollars 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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($13,000.00), that said indebtedness was due and payable, 
that notwithstanding Plaintiffs' demands, Defendant had 
failed to make payment as agreed and was in default and 
that Plaintiffs held a valid real estate mortgage securing 
the aforesaid indebtedness of Defendant and were entitled 
as a matter of law to foreclose upon it. The Court also 
granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count 
II of their Complaint. Defendant moved for a new trial, 
but his notion was denied. An appeal to this Court followed, 
Case No. 14976, and the judgment of the lower Court was 
affirmed. Defendant moved for an order vacating the judg-
ment which motion was denied on the 29th day of March, 1978. 
This appeal followed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a new trial on all issues and 
requests that this Court consider newly discovered evidence. 
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs agree with that portion of Defendant's 
statement of facts admitting that he was in debt to Plain-
tiffs in the sum of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00) 
- 2 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and that said indebtedness was secured by a mortgage exe-
cuted by the said Defendant. However, because of the 
misleading nature of other allegations made in Defendant's 
statement of facts, and the fact that said statement is 
not supported by the Record, Plaintiffs deem it necessary 
to supplement and explain said statement as follows: 
On April 13, 1976, Defendant filed an answer to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint wherein he admitted all allegations 
made by Plaintiffs in Count I thereof. Record at 25. 
Among other things Defendant admitted that on May 22, 
1972, he executed a promissory note to Plaintiffs in ex-
change for their loan to him of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($12,500.00), which note was secured by a mortgage 
on certain real property. Record at 2-3, 25. He further 
admitted that on June 29, 1972, following the loan to him 
of an additional Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), he executed 
and delivered to Plaintiffs a real estate mortgage on the 
same property which was to replace the first and serve as 
security for both the $12,500.00 and the $500.00 debts. 
Record at 3, 25. Defendant also admitted that the promis-
sory note for $12,500.00 and the indebtedness of $500.00 
were both due and owing, and that despite Plaintiffs' demands 
for payment he had paid no part of either obligation. Record 
at 3, 25. 
- 3 -
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In addition to the admissions made by Defendant 
in his answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint herein, he failed 
to raise any affirmative defenses. Record at 25. Despite 
the fact that eight months passed between the time the 
Defendant filed his answer, as aforesaid, and the time of 
trial (December 14, 1976) at no time did he amend or seek 
leave to amend his answer to include any affirmative 
defenses. 
At the time of trial, though Defendant was present 
in person and was represented by counsel, he at no time 
contested the accuracy, authenticity or validity of the 
documents and testimony presented by Plaintiffs in evidence 
of their claims, nor did he take exception to the findings 
of the Court. Record at 90-97, 166-68. Moreover, Defen-
dant, through his attorney Omer J. Call, stated in open 
Court that he had no objection to the granting of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II of their Complaint 
and to the filing and docketing of that judgment in its 
proper position with respect to other judgments and liens 
so that it could be paid out of any foreclosure sale. 
Record at 2-3, 75-83, 86-87; Transcript at 48. 
On February 4, 1977 following entry of the summary 
judgment and the decree of foreclosure on December 27, 1976, 
- 4 -
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and January 10, 1977, Defendant moved for a new trial, 
alleging as grounds therefore the discovery of new evi-
dence and witnesses and other grounds which he raises on 
this appeal. Record at 110-144. Among other things he 
sought to introduce for the first time the affirmative 
defense of waiver. Record at 123. On March 30, 1977, 
Defendant's Motion for a new trial was denied. Record at 
164-173. An appeal to this Court followed and the judgment 
of the lower Court was affirmed in all respects. Record 
at 178-180. No petition for rehearing was filed. 
On January 24, 1978, Defendant filed in the lower 
Court a petition to "set aside the Supreme Court verdict 
for further investigation of a willful tort or more speci-
fically fraud" and on February 14, 1978, a motion to vacate 
judgment was filed. Record at 191, 212-214. On March 29, 
1978, an order denying said motions was entered. Record at 
311-313. 
On March 31, 1978, a "writ of injunction" signed 
by Defendant only was filed, Record at 314-315; on April 11, 
1978, a "request extension of time to make motion for new 
trial" was filed, Record at 318; on April 13, 1978, an 
"amendment on motion for a new trial and to correct the 
judgment" was filed, Record at 319-321; on April 17, 1978, 
- 5 -
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a "motion for amendment continuance and to correct the 
judgment" was filed, Record at 333; on April 25, 1978, a 
"supplemental amendment and motion to correct judgment" 
and a "notice of appeal" were filed, Record at 336-347; on 
the 1st day of May, 1978, a "motion for deletion and addi-
tion to supplemental amendment" was filed, Record at 348-
358; on Nay 2, 1978, a "motion to strike or delete from a 
filed appeal" was filed, Record at 359; on May 4, 1978, a 
"motion on estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel," a 
"motion to set aside satisfaction of the judgment" and 
a "bill of illegality" were filed, Record at 360-362; on 
May 9, 1978, a "motion to correct a statement in the supple-
mental amendment or to add a statement" was filed, Record 
at 367; and on May 15, 1978, a letter from Defendant to t~ 
Box Elder County Sheriff's Office wherein Defendant re-
presents that Mr. Justice Maughn of this Court, speaking 
for the body of justices, had offered a mandamus or com-
pelling document on behalf of Defendant and an "objection 
of sheriff sale position of sustained occupancy and posses-
sion" were filed, Record at 385-386. All of the foregoing 
documents were filed by Defendant with the Clerk of Box 
Elder County and none of the motions was ever noticed. 
- 6 -
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THIS APPEAL FROM THE PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DECEMBER 27, 1976 
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
This appeal is taken by Defendant "from the judg-
ment entered into this action on March 27, 1978 and partial 
judgment ~ntered on December 27, 1976." Record at 347. 
Since there was no judgment entered on March 27, 1978, 
Plaintiffs assume that Defendant is referring to the order 
denying motion of Defendants Noel L. Cook and Helen Cook 
to vacate judgment and order vacating temporary restrain-
ing order and preliminary injunction which was entered on 
March 29, 1978. Record at 311-313. The "partial judgment" 
entered on December 27, 1976, is the partial sununary judgment 
in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Noel L. Cook on 
Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint which was entered on 
December 27, 1976. Record at 086-088. 
Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in relevant part: 
When an appeal is permitted from a dis-
trict court to the Supreme Court, the 
time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month from the entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from unless 
a shorter time is provided by law, except 
that upon a showing of excusable neglect 
- 7 -
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based on a failure of a party to learn 
of the entry of the judgment the dis-
trict court in any action may extend 
the time for appeal not exceeding one 
month from the expiration of the ori-
ginal time herein prescribed. The 
running of the time for appeal is ter-
minated by a timely motion made pursuant 
to any of the rules hereinafter enumer-
ated, and the full time for appeal fixed 
in this subdivision commences to run 
and is to be computed from the entry in 
the minutes of any of the following 
orders made upon a timely motion under 
such rules: granting or denying a 
motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), 
or granting or denying a motion for 
judgment under Rule 52(b) to amend or 
make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; or granting or denying a 
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend 
the judgment; or denying a motion for 
a new trial under Rule 59. 
Each motion referred to in Rule 73(a), as aforesaid, to be 
timely, must be filed within ten days after entry of the 
judgment or order in question. 
The partial summary judgment from which Defendant 
now appeals was entered on December 27, 1976 and an order 
denying Defendant's motion for a new trial was entered on 
March 30, 1977. None of the other motions referred to in 
Rule 73(a) was timely filed by Defendant and the time for 
Defendant to appeal from said partial summary judgment expire 
- 8 -
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on May 2, 1977, a Monday. Since this appeal was not filed 
until April 25, 1978, it was not timely and should be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. Ratliff, Estate of, v. 
Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571. 
alleges: 
Point II 
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY HELD THAT THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT II OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED. 
In Count II of their Complaint Plaintiffs allege: 
Defendant Noel L. Cook owes Plaintiffs 
$3,944.68 for money lent by Plaintiffs to 
said Defendant on or about the 1st day of 
June, 1974, and the 14th day of November, 
1974. Record at 004. 
In his answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint Defendant 
Defendant denies having received $3,944.00 
in June or November, 1974, as this case has 
gone to appeal. Record at 025. 
On December 1, 1976, Plaintiffs filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment against Defendant on Count II 
of their Complaint and supported their motion with an affi-
davit and memorandum of points and authorities. Record at 
075-083. No counter-affidavits or memoranda were filed by 
Defendant and during the trial of this action Defendant, 
through counsel, stated that he had no objection to the 
- 9 -
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granting of the motion. Transcript at 48. On Defendant's 
first appeal, this Count, relying on Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 
242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973), observed and held, 
Plaintiff Melvin moved for summary 
judgment on his cause of action for 
$3,944 and filed an affidavit in 
support thereof. Before the motion 
was heard trial began, at which time 
the motion was renewed. Noel, who was 
represented by counsel at trial, did 
not object, nor did he file an affi-
davit or offer anything in opposition 
to plaintiff's contention. The judg-
ment on that count was therefore pro-
perly granted. Record at 179. 
Point III 
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY PROPERLY HELD 
THAT DEFENDA..NT CANNOT AVAIL HIMSELF OF 
THE DEFENSES OF WAIVER AND IMPROPER 
ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE DUE DATE 
AND THAT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS I10TION 
FOR A NEhT TRIAL WAS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Although Defendant states in his Notice of Appeal 
that he appeals from the order denying his motion to vacate 
judgment which was entered on I1arch 29, 1978, he argues in 
his brief that Plaintiffs waived their right to collect on 
the obligation described in Count I of their Complaint, 
that acceleration of the mortgage due date was improper 
and that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion for 
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a new trial ~n March 30, 1977, all of which he argued on 
his first appeal. Brief of Defendant - Appellant at 6-17; 
Brief of Defendant - Appellant on first appeal. 
In Count I of their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege 
that the sum of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00), 
together with interest, attorney's fees and costs, is now 
due and payable.by Defendant to Plaintiffs, that no part 
thereof has been paid notwithstanding the fact that Plain-
tiffs have demanded payment and that the Court should deter-
mine the amount due and owing, order that Plaintiffs' security 
interest be foreclosed and that the property be sold as 
provided by law to satisfy said amount and accruing costs. 
Record at 001-005. In his answer to Count I of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint Defendant concedes all of the allegations thereof. 
Record at 025. 
In this appeal, as in the first appeal, Defendant 
claims that Plaintiffs waived prompt payment when due and 
that acceleration of the mortgage due date was improper. 
In affirming the judgment of the Trial Court on the first 
appeal, this Court observed and held: 
On this appeal defendant attacks the 
judgment and decree of foreclosure on 
two grounds: (1) that plaintiffs had 
previously waived prompt payments when 
due and (2) that acceleration of the 
mortgage due date was improper. 
- 11 -
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Concerning those contentions these ob-
servations are pertinent: In his answer 
to the mortgage foreclosure count, the 
defendant had not only stated "Conceded" 
but had failed to plead the two affirma-
tive defenses he now attempts to raise. 
Inasmuch as those issues were neither 
presented nor tried in the district 
court, there is no basis upon which we 
could consider them on appeal. Record 
at 179. 
In his first appeal, Defendant contended that 
the Trial Court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, 
having based his motion on claims of irregularity in the 
proceedings of the Trial Court, or adverse party, accident 
or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against, and newly discovered evidence which could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at 
trial. Brief of Defendant - Appellant on first appeal at 
11. On this claim this Court held: 
Defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial is without merit. He failed to 
meet any requirement of Rule 59, U.R. 
C.P. requisite to the granting of a new 
trial. Record at 179. 
Defendant reasserts on this appeal that he should 
have been given a new trial and bases his assertion on the 
same claims. Brief of Appellant - Defendant at 15. In 
support of his claims he states that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion in the following particulars: 
- 12 -
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a. Judge refused to accept an only amendment 
which violates the spirit of the federal 
rules of civil procedure. 
b. At no time was Appellant permitted to take 
witness stand to present an available 
defense. 
c. The judge refused the Appellant opportun-
ity sought to cross-examine the Respondent 
in set-aside hearing on fraud without a jury 
where the sole purpose was to obtain per-
mission of Respondent for certain subpoena 
information essential to his defense. 
d. The judge made little effort at simple 
construction of circumstantial evidence 
in possible fraud which violates the 
principal duty of courts of equity deal-
ing with real property. 
e. Early in the hearing the judge stated that 
he was ready at that time to rule on the 
case thus pointing up possible bias, pre-
judice and which he was not able to over-
come. 
There is no support in the record or in fact for the fore-
going. If it is Defendant's position that he should be given 
a new trial on the hearing on his motion to vacate judgment, 
then his position is wholly without merit. No motion for a 
new trial was ever filed, and if the motions filed on and 
after April 11, 1978, are construed as motions for a new 
trial they were not timely filed under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure since they were filed more than ten 
(10) days after entry of the order denying the motion to 
- 13 -
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vacate judgment on March 29, 1978. Only the "writ of 
injunction" filed by Defendant on March 31, 1978, would 
be timely and no request is made therein for a new trial. 
Point IV 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SEEK EQUITABLE 
RELIEF FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT WITHIN THREE MONTHS 
AFTER THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AND IS 
AFFORDED NO REMEDY UNDER THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT. 
On February 13, 1978, Defendant filed with the 
Trial Court, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b) (3) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
alleging as grounds therefor that fraud and misrepresen-
tation had been committed by Plaintiffs in obtaining the 
judgment. Record at 212-214. The judgments from which 
Defendant sought relief consisted of the partial summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Noel 
L. Cook on Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint which was 
entered on December 27, 1978, and the decree of foreclosurE 
which was entered on January 10, 1977. Record at 086-088 
and 099-105. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
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On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
suprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether hereto-
fore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; (4) when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant 
as required by Rule 4(e) and the defen-
dant has failed to appear in said action; 
(5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; 
or (7) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or 
(4), not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was en-
tered or taken. (Emphasis added) 
This Court has held that such Motions are ineffective if 
made more than three months after the judgment is entered. 
!1cGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972); 
Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 947 (1959). 
The last judgment in this action was entered 
January 10, 1976, the date on which it was signed and 
filed. Record at 099-105. Rule 58A (c) of the Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure provides that a "judgment is complete 
and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the 
creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as hereinabove provided." Thus, for 
purposes of Rule 60(b), Defendant had until April 10, 1977 
to file his motion. By failing to do so, his February 13, 
1978 motion was ineffective and was properly denied. 
Defendant argued to the Trial Court that his 
filing of a timely appeal tolled the running of the time 
within which a Rule 60(b) motion could properly be filed. 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was modeled 
after Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 
distinction between the two rules is that the Federal Rule 
affords parties one year in which to attack a judgment on 
the grounds of mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fra~. 
Yet, in all other ways material to this action, the two 
rules are identical. In construing Rule 60 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Courts have unanimously 
held that the filing of an appeal does not toll the period 
of time in which parties may attack a final judgment. ~ 
v. District of Columbia, 543 Fed. 2d 917 (D.C. Cir., 1976); 
Greater Boston Television Corporation v. F.C.C., 463 Fed. 2d 
268 (D.C. Cir., 1971); Gulf Coast Building and Supply Com~ 
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Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical i·lorkers, 
Local No. 458, A.F.L.-C.I.O., 460 Fed. 2d 105 (5th Cir., 
1972); Lairsey v. Advance Abrasures Company, 542 Fed. 2d 
928 (5th Cir., 1976). Under these decisions, a party 
attacking a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (3) 
(fraud) must file his motion within one year of the entry 
of the final judgment by the trial court or his motion is 
untimely. Moreover, it has been held that Clause 6 (which 
is identical to Clause 7 of the Utah Rule) and the first 
five clauses of Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive with the 
result that Clause 6 affords no basis for relief at any 
time if available under either of the earlier clauses. 
Carr v. District of Columbia, supra. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Trial Court 
read and examined the affidavits, memoranda and other doc-
uments and papers in the file, heard argument of counsel 
and concluded that there was no fraudulent representation 
or conduct on the part of the Plaintiffs or any other reason 
for which the judgment entered on January 10, 1977, should 
be vacated, and denied Defendant's motion. Record at 311-313. 
The burden was upon the Defendant to prove fraud 
by clear and convincing evidence and the question as to 
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whether the evidence is clear and convincing is usually 
determined by the trier of the facts. Pace v. Parrish, 
247 P.2d 273, 122 Utah 141 (1952); Condas v. Adams, 388 
P.2d 803, 15 Utah 2d 132 (1964). Fraud is a wrong of 
such nature that it must be shown by clear and convincing 
proof and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo. 
Lundstrom v. Rodeo Corporation of America, ~05 P.2d 339, 
17 Utah 2d 114 (1965). The long standing rules of appel-
late procedure require this Court to view the evidence in 
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and not 
to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
below on issues of fact determined from competent admis-
sible evidence. Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah, 
1978). The Trial Court below properly ruled in this case 
that there was no fraud committed by Plaintiffs and no 
other reason for which the judgment should be vacated. 
Point V 
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ARISING AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSE 
OF THIS APPEAL. 
In the instant case the Defendant agreed to pay 
reasonable attorney's fees necessitated by legal action to 
enforce the note and to foreclose the mortgage. Record at 
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6, 8, 11. As the record clearly shows, the Plaintiffs 
brought suit in good faith to pursue their legal rights 
and prevailed in the lower court. Defendant's motion for 
a new trial was denied and this Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Trial Court on the first appeal. Defendant's 
motions following the first appeal and this second appeal 
constitute tactics calculated to delay and to deny Plain-
tiffs their legal rights and have resulted in burdening the 
Plaintiffs with the expenses necessary to defend Defendant's 
actions. 
An award of attorney's fees on appeal is discre-
tionary with the Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and 
Inv. Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955). Upon the 
facts of this case it would be proper to award the Plain-
tiffs reasonable attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal from the partial summary judgment 
entered on December 27, 1976, was not timely filed and 
this Court has already held that said judgment was properly 
granted. This Court has already properly held that Defen-
dant cannot avail himself of the defenses of waiver and 
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improper acceleration of the mortgage due date and that 
Defendant's claim that the Trial Court erred in denying 
his motion for a new trial was without merit. Defendant 
failed to seek equitable relief from the final judgment 
of the Trial Court within three months after the judgment 
was entered and is, therefore, afforded no remedy under 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, 
the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion to vacate judgment. The decision of 
the Trial Court should, therefore, be affirmed with costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs. 
1978. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i!1:!::! day of October I 
~,icOb 
'RObertF:Orton 
HANSEN & ORTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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